The Russia-Ukraine War
Four years of full-scale conflict: the military situation, diplomacy, economics, internal politics, and what comes next.
Timeline of Major Events
From the February 2022 invasion through the diplomatic efforts of early 2026. Major events marked with larger dots.
Military Situation
Front lines, force composition, Western weapons, drones, and the human cost.
Russia traded over 400,000 casualties for 0.8% of Ukrainian territory in 2025.CSIS analysis, January 2026
Front Lines (March 2026)
Russia occupies approximately 20% of Ukraine's internationally recognised territory (~116,000 km²), including Crimea, most of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts south of the Dnipro.
Russian gains have slowed markedly in early 2026. February saw Russia's smallest monthly territorial gain since July 2024. Meanwhile, Ukraine launched counterattacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast liberating over 400 km² — the first month since 2024 where Ukraine regained more territory than it lost.
ISW assesses Russia is preparing a spring-summer 2026 offensive targeting Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and/or Zaporizhzhia, but Ukraine's counterattacks may be burning through Russian operational reserves.
Force Composition
Russia
Russia recruited approximately 422,000 personnel in 2025 and targets 409,000 for 2026. The Kremlin avoids formal mobilisation, relying on contract soldiers, foreign recruits, and — increasingly — coercive methods. Tank production is scaling to 428 T-90M/M2 tanks per year by 2028. However, Russia has shifted to "demechanised" warfare: gaining 30% more ground in 2025 while using fewer tanks, instead relying on dismounted infantry, FPV drones, and glide bombs.
Ukraine
Ukraine faces a severe manpower crisis. It needed 300,000 recruits in early 2025 but managed only ~200,000. AWOL cases surged to 576 per day by mid-2025. The mobilisation age was lowered to 25 in 2024, but coercive recruitment undermines motivation.
Western Weapons
The US has provided $66.9 billion in military assistance since 2022, but new support declined 99% under Trump. Europe has stepped up: military aid rose 67%, and the EU approved €90 billion in loans for 2026-2027.
The Drone War
Drone warfare defines this conflict. Ukraine aims to produce 7 million military drones in 2026. Interceptor drones now down 70%+ of Russian Shaheds near Kyiv at a 1:50 to 1:150 cost ratio versus traditional air defence. Russia has responded with jet-powered glide bombs extending range to 150-200 km, dropping a record 5,717 aerial bombs in January 2026 alone.
North Korean Troops
Approximately 15,000 North Korean troops deployed to Russia since late 2024. South Korean intelligence estimates ~6,000 casualties (killed + wounded) by February 2026. Deployed primarily in Kursk.
| Metric | Russia | Ukraine |
|---|---|---|
| Est. military killed | 275,000–325,000 | 100,000–140,000 |
| Est. total casualties | ~1.2M | 500,000–600,000 |
| Annual recruitment (2025) | 422,000 | ~200,000 |
| 2025 drone production | ~30,000 Shaheds | 3–4 million |
| Defence spending (2025) | ~$175B (7.2% GDP) | ~$52B (external aid) |
Diplomacy & Peace Efforts
From Minsk to Istanbul to Trump's 28-point plan — four years of failed negotiations and shifting alliances.
Minsk Background (2014-2022)
The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 aimed to resolve the Donbas conflict through ceasefire, decentralisation, and elections. They were never implemented. Both sides accused the other of violations, and sequencing disputes (elections first or border control first) proved intractable. Former Chancellor Merkel later acknowledged Minsk also served to buy Ukraine time to strengthen its military.
Istanbul Talks (March 2022)
The most substantive negotiations produced a framework: Ukrainian neutrality in exchange for security guarantees, limits on military size, EU membership permitted, and deferred discussion of Crimea and Donbas. The talks collapsed after the Bucha massacre hardened Ukrainian opinion, and the improving military situation reduced Kyiv's incentive to concede.
Peace Plans (2022-2024)
Zelenskyy's 10-point formula (November 2022) was maximalist: full withdrawal to pre-2014 borders including Crimea, war crimes tribunal, reparations. Russia rejected it outright.
China's 12-point position paper (February 2023) called for ceasing hostilities and ending sanctions but did not condemn the invasion or call for Russian withdrawal. Western analysts characterised it as aligned with Russian interests.
The Burgenstock summit (June 2024) in Switzerland drew 100 delegations but Russia didn't attend and key Global South nations declined to sign the communique.
Trump Administration Approach (2025-2026)
Trump promised to end the war "in 24 hours" but results have been mixed. Special envoy Kellogg was sidelined. The White House confrontation with Zelenskyy (February 2025) was a public low point. Intelligence sharing was briefly paused. The minerals deal was eventually signed in April 2025.
The 28-point peace plan (November 2025) proposed: ceding Donbas de facto, capping Ukraine's military, barring NATO membership, with $100B in frozen assets for reconstruction and US receiving 50% of profits. Critics called it heavily pro-Russian. A December meeting produced the "90% agreed" claim, but core issues remained unresolved.
Trilateral Talks (January-February 2026)
Three rounds of US-brokered talks in Abu Dhabi and Geneva — the first sustained negotiations since 2022. A prisoner exchange was agreed. Envoy Witkoff claimed talks were "down to one issue" (territory). But the Geneva round ended abruptly after two hours, and Russia launched strikes during the talks.
As of 18 March 2026, talks are paused due to the Iran conflict. Zelenskyy says Ukraine is ready to continue. Russia shows no urgency.
European Response
The war catalysed the largest European defence build-up since the Cold War. NATO raised its spending target to 5% of GDP by 2035. Poland leads at 4.48%. Germany amended its constitution to exempt defence spending from the debt brake, projecting €83B for 2026. The EU's ReArm Europe plan enables up to €800 billion in additional defence spending through 2030.
Sanctions & Economic Impact
The sanctions regime, Russia's resilience, energy disruption, and Ukraine's reconstruction challenge.
19 EU Packages
The EU has adopted 19 sanctions packages, covering trade, energy, finance, and 2,200+ designated individuals. The US imposed new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025 under Trump.
Russian Gas: 40% → 6%
Russia's share of EU pipeline gas fell from 40% to 6%. The EU adopted a full ban on all Russian gas (pipeline + LNG) to be phased out by end 2027.
$300 Billion
Russian Central Bank reserves frozen globally, now indefinitely. Interest income funds EU loans to Ukraine. Full confiscation remains debated but kept as a future option.
Russian Economic Resilience
Russia's GDP growth slowed from 4.1% (2024) to ~1% (2025), with stagnation forecast for 2026. The economy overheated from military spending; the central bank raised rates to 21% before cutting to 15.5%. A shadow fleet of ~978 tankers carries 68% of Russian crude exports, circumventing the oil price cap. China and India receive 80% of Russian oil.
The economy has split: a growing military-industrial sector and a stagnating civilian economy. 31% of Russians now struggle to afford food, and the country faces a projected labour shortage of 10.9 million workers by 2030.
Military-Industrial Complex
Defence spending reached $175 billion in 2025 (~7.2% of GDP), consuming nearly 40% of federal spending. Artillery shell production expanded 17-fold. Russia produces three times more shells than the US and Europe combined for Ukraine. However, there are signs the defence-sector boom may have peaked.
Ukraine's Economy
GDP remains 21% below pre-war levels. Reconstruction costs are estimated at $588 billion over 10 years. Western aid exceeds $400 billion total. The EU approved €90 billion in new loans for 2026-2027. Ukraine's 2025 budget depended on $38.4 billion in Western aid to cover a deficit of 19.6% of GDP.
Grain Exports
After Russia exited the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, Ukraine established its own corridor through NATO-aligned waters, exploiting its neutralisation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine remains a top-5 global grain exporter, though volumes remain below pre-war benchmarks.
| Russia GDP Growth | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 (f) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -2.1% | +3.6% | +4.1% | ~1% | 0.6-1.4% |
Internal Politics
Domestic dynamics in Russia and Ukraine — repression, mobilisation, and the human cost of war.
Repression
14,900+ detained at anti-war protests. 1,000+ criminal cases. 820–2,000+ political prisoners. 700,000 websites blocked. 15-year sentences for calling the war "a war."
Brain Drain
~1.3 million emigrated in 2022, 70% with higher education. 100,000+ IT specialists left. Only 8% returned between 2023–2024. Labour shortage of 10.9M projected by 2030.
Mobilisation Crisis
AWOL rates surged to 576/day by mid-2025. ~2 million estimated evading the draft. Draft age lowered to 25, but coercive recruitment undermines morale and effectiveness.
Russian Domestic Situation
War support has eroded significantly. The Levada Center found only 25% of Russians support continuing the war as of December 2025 — the lowest since the invasion. 66% favour peace talks. Putin won re-election in March 2024 with 87% in what Meduza called "almost certainly the most fraudulent" Russian election in modern history.
Wagner Mutiny and Aftermath
Prigozhin's 36-hour rebellion in June 2023 was the most serious challenge to Putin's authority in two decades. His assassination two months later was widely seen as the Kremlin's reassertion of its monopoly on violence. Wagner was rebranded as the state-controlled Africa Corps in December 2023.
Navalny's Death
Alexei Navalny died in an Arctic penal colony on 16 February 2024. Russia claimed natural causes. In February 2026, the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands identified the cause as epibatidine, a laboratory-made toxin. His widow Yulia Navalnaya has emerged as the leading opposition figure in exile.
Ukrainian Politics
Martial law has been extended 18 times through May 2026, preventing elections. Zelenskyy's term nominally expired in May 2024, but constitutional lawyers consider his continuation lawful. Under Trump pressure, Zelenskyy indicated readiness for elections within 60-90 days if security guarantees are provided.
War Fatigue on Both Sides
Ukrainian support for "fighting until victory" dropped from 73% (2022) to 24% (2025). However, 76% reject peace on Russian terms. On the Russian side, 55% expect the war to end in 2026, but only a third would support returning annexed territories.
Analysis & Outlook
Where the war stands, where it might go, and what the world is learning.
The conditions for a durable settlement do not yet exist.Brookings multi-author analysis, February 2026
State of Play
Neither side holds decisive momentum. Russia has more mass but is suffering unsustainable casualties. Ukraine has more innovation and Western support but faces critical manpower constraints. The situation is strategic stalemate — both sides capable of localised operations, neither able to break through.
Likely Trajectories
Most likely: Continued attritional stalemate
The war continues at roughly current intensity with slow Russian gains offset by periodic Ukrainian counterattacks. Steven Pifer (Stanford/Brookings) assesses "the war will continue" as the most probable outcome. Conditions for settlement do not yet exist.
Possible: Negotiated settlement by late 2026
The Trump administration's June 2026 deadline, trilateral talks, and French/UK troop pledges suggest diplomatic machinery is being assembled. But Brookings characterises Trump's mediation as "a year of failure," and core issues remain far apart.
Lower probability: Frozen conflict
The war de-escalates without formal settlement. A de facto ceasefire emerges along current lines — analogous to Korea. International attention shifting to other crises makes this more plausible.
What a Settlement Might Look Like
- Territory: De facto frozen line of control without formal cession — analogous to the inter-Korean border
- Security: European troop deployments (France/UK), US monitoring via drones/sensors, Ukrainian self-defence capacity
- NATO: Off the table for the foreseeable future; Russia considers blocking membership a core war objective
- Economics: Conditional sanctions relief tied to compliance; frozen asset interest for reconstruction; EU membership fast-tracking
Key Uncertainties
- US policy: The single largest variable. Trump has sent mixed signals — minerals deal vs. oil sanctions rollback
- European commitment: $197B provided so far, but sustaining this over years will strain budgets and political will
- Russian staying power: Economy slowing but not collapsing; recruitment sustaining losses but pool not infinite
- Ukrainian manpower: The most critical operational challenge; 140,000 killed, plus millions fled abroad
- Iran conflict: Competing for Western attention, resources, and potentially redirecting defensive munitions
Lessons Learned
Military
- Drone revolution: FPV drones are the dominant weapon; naval drones achieved sea denial without a navy; drone-vs-drone warfare creates rapid innovation cycles
- Return of attrition warfare: Manoeuvre warfare has proven extremely difficult against prepared defences with extensive surveillance
- Fortifications matter: The Surovikin Line blunted Ukraine's 2023 offensive; Ukrainian fortifications have slowed Russian advances
- Industrial base matters more than initial stockpiles: Both sides had to crash-produce ammunition and equipment; Western procurement systems proved too slow
- Electronic warfare is decisive: Both sides invest heavily in EW to jam drones, communications, and GPS
Political & Strategic
- Sanctions are a slow weapon: Imposed costs and constraints but did not cause collapse or compel behavioural change
- Alliance cohesion depends on domestic politics: The Western response was more unified than expected, but Trump's shifts show it cannot be taken for granted
- Nuclear deterrence constrains response: Russia's arsenal limited Western intervention, creating a paradox where nuclear weapons enable conventional aggression
- Energy interdependence is a vulnerability: Europe's pre-war dependence on Russian gas proved a critical weakness
- Conventional deterrence failed: Russia invaded despite NATO and sanctions because Putin calculated the costs were manageable